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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In a public consultation paper, the European Union (EU) asks its citizens and Member 
States to come up with ideas how to reform the EU Budget. The challenge of our paper---to 
answer the consultation paper---is to give a novel angle from the point of Austrian/Constitutional 
economics towards the selection among the budgetary powers made available to the EU. 
We do suggest guidelines for exclusion and inclusion of provisions in the EU-Budget that 
are not prizes captured in negotiations, often partisan struggles, between the Member States. The 
focus is on the normative evaluation of quasi-permanent budgetary institutions and their tasks. We 
do also suggest that such a constitutional framework creates trust and facilitates a robust 
democratic debate. The emphasis is not, as is usually the case based on a benevolent EU, to 
enhance economic efficiency (making the EU “work better”) and/or to increase the equity of 
budget rules. We do test a different approach: an analysis that we define by the limits it places on 
the powers of Brussels, an egoistic despot, to “tax and spend”.  
 
 
BACKGROUND AND APPROACH TO THE 
PROBLEM 
 
 
The 2007 consultation call by the Commission is, in the words of Dalia Grybauskaite 
(European Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget), a “unique, may be once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity”, to discuss a fundamental review of the EU Budget (Reforming the Budget, 
2007). The road suggested in the Commission’s consultation paper, just as the approach after the 
rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty, can be a very toilsome process inside the realm of 
partisan (Member States’) advocacy. Solidarity, for instance, has to be bought with financial pet 
projects for individual Member States. Alternatively, budget reform is discussed by the direct 
application of abstract ethical norms in a vacuous (without a model of governmental-political 
behavior) institutional setting.  
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The paper shifts the grounds for the debate on the reform of the EU budget towards a 
fundamental review: it focuses on the choices among quasi-permanent constraints (within which 
alternatives should the EU’s budgetary powers be exercised) and not, as is usually the case on 
choices within given constraints. The paper adopts a rule-based perspective on the EU Budget: we 
do choose long-lived rules: once selected, they will remain in being over an indeterminately long 
sequence of budgetary periods. We should take literally Grybauskaite’s remark about an “once-in-
a-lifetime possibility”. Members States are unable to predict with precision what their position will 
be at any particular moment in the future. In particular, they are presumed to be unable to identify 
their position (a veil of ignorance) either as payer or as spending beneficiary in a sequence of 
separate budgetary periods. History shows that these kinds of debate about a framework for 
political action, not an instrument thereof, have been possible and fruitful (Elster, 2000).  
 
 
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 
 
 
The limits of democracy 
 
 
In the middle of the previous century, Friedrich Hayek (1949, pp. 255-72), an Austrian-
born economist, wrote that democracy can only under very restricted conditions be transposed to a 
supra-national organization. A little later, his American counter-ego Milton Friedman said the 
same. If you apply both ideas to the situation in Europe, we have to conclude that the EU is not 
only missing the necessary homogeneity to form clear policy goals in a democratic way, but it 
misses as well the stimuli not to waste money.  
Why is it so hard to expect concrete policy goals and fiscal constraint from the European 
parliament---the most democratic institution of the EU? Of course, very general objectives (e.g., 
prosperity for everyone) will be easy to agree on. After that, however, it becomes difficult. 
Concrete objectives will be difficult to formulate. The countries of the EU differ too much in 
culture, history and economic development. Every choice supposes a balancing of the pros and 
cons. The recently weakened Services Directive of 2006, e.g., is supposed to show the social face 
of the EU. No worker from Eastern Europe, however, will be glad with the “social protection” of 
the revised directive or the “social clause” in the new Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Within a relatively 
homogeneous country like the Netherlands, however, the original directive would be no problem. 
Every plumber from the north of the Netherlands is welcome in the south. Likewise, the 
Netherlands, e.g., is supporting with a low price of gas a national pride: the agriculture of 
vegetables in greenhouses in the west of the country. However, the very same solidarity for, e.g., a 
Spanish national pride is something completely different.  
Hence, if a parliament cannot give and agree on policy objectives, the European 
Commission remains de facto the administration. Often below the guise that it concerns only a 
technical affair. That is hard to maintain. Over a change in policy, no matter how technically it 
does look like, the parliament belongs to decide. Moreover, also the Commission has to do with 
the various wishes of the Member States that do make up the members of the Commission.  
The EU, also, has hardly any incentives not to waste money. The best guarantee not to 
waste money is that the same person both owns and does spend the money (Friedman, [1979], 
1981, p. 146). For then we can expect that people and Member States do loan on the penny and see 
to it that you they do get value for your money. Members of parliaments or commission members, 
however, do spend others men’s money, on behave of, often again, other men. That is almost a 
guarantee for ineffective and inefficient spending. Of members of a local parliament we can expect 
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some restraint in spending the taxpayers’ money of their own citizens. What to think, however, of 
an Eastern-European member of the EU-parliament who does spend the money of West-European 
taxpayers at projects in Eastern Europe? To satisfy the members of parliament of Western-
European countries pork-barrel legislation will rise. Not much different as is presently the case in 
the US where the support of congressional representatives has to be bought with financial presents 
(pet projects) for their local constituents. In short, we will see more signs along the roads that state, 
“This project has been realized with the help of the EU”. A project, if the Member State had to 
decide and pay for itself, it would not have spent the money on.  
 
 
The limits of centralizing knowledge 
 
 
Why does the Treaty of Lisbon set out individual freedom as one of the core values of the 
EU? It is a good in itself. Man is first and for all a spiritual being. We can only make real choices 
based on individual freedom. Freedom is also essential to develop as a moral being. The choices, 
e.g., we make to help other people, have to be taken in freedom.  
 Individual freedom, however, is also a necessity for the market economy. Not only, 
quite visible, the climate and the physical characteristics of the Member States do differ, but, less 
visible, though of more importance, also men in their preferences and knowledge do differ. A 
market economy does make an optimal use of those differences in knowledge (Hayek, 1982, Vol. 
1). Hence, the problem in a market economy is not to give the central authorities, be it Brussels or 
a local government, all the extra knowledge it needs to pursue policy. The problem is to give each 
individual all the extra knowledge he needs, mostly in the form of price (profit) signals, so he can 
decide for himself how to pursue his own goals. In this way, society does make use of often-
unique knowledge of local circumstances and preferences that do differ in time. Knowledge that is 
difficult to centralize. An idea as valid for individuals as it is for countries. Hayek describes the 
market process as one of learning by discovery. We are looking at the core of Austrian economics: 
knowledge dissemination and the discovery thereof are of central importance.  
In short, a market economy makes room for human freedom and uses existing knowledge 
the best. Hence we should make decisions re rules on an as decentralized level as possible. The 
economic way to solve problems when sovereignty sharing by the way of a complete harmonizing 
of all rules is impossible is to apply the concept of mutually recognition of differences (Backhaus, 
2001, p. 9). In a market exchange, strong differences of opinion are taken care of in a peaceful 
way. Subsidiarity, an organizing and enforceable principle, is congruent with the market. 
Subsidiarity has remained a part of the new (reformed) European Treaty of Lisbon. It states that 
we should only shift powers to Brussels when Member States themselves cannot achieve the same 
results. (Treaty, 2004, Title III, Article I-11). From this principle, which we can also describe as 
economic federalism, flows the responsibility of the Member States to provide the legal conditions 
under which the citizens can accumulate wealth in order to satisfy their needs themselves. In a 
sense, competition between local authorities or Member States, where there is freedom of 
movement, provides experimentation with alternative models that is conducive to growth. It 
resembles the market economy best (Hayek, [1960], 2006, p. 230). 
 
 
CONSTITITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
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A constitution contains a principle-based limitation of the role of government in society 
and defines the basic rules for ordinary politics. A constitution is a framework for political action, 
not an instrument for action (Elster, 2000, p. 100). In constitutional economics, we define the rules 
of the socio-economic-political game. We have to make two sorts of constitutional decisions. First, 
we must choose from possible constitutional (so-called higher law) rules. Behind a veil of 
ignorance, countries and people choose electoral and non-electoral constitutional rules. No one 
knows his future position. (Of all the Member States, Germany broke the rules of Pact on Stability 
and Growth. Though beforehand Germany was a most unlikely candidate.) It is at this initial 
constitutional decision stage, where we choose the basic fiscal arrangements, that citizens not only 
can really control the state, but widespread public agreement is possible (Brennan and Buchanan, 
2000). This since the prospect for general agreement changes dramatically if we allow for some 
introduction of ignorance and/or uncertainty into the Member States’ calculus. The prospects of 
agreement relate directly to the predicted length of life of the tax reform. Then we will tend to opt 
for rules that are “fair”. Hence the measures to be discussed below are meant not just for the 
upcoming, 2013, sixth financial framework but “forever”. Besides, it is always easier to secure 
agreement on a set of rules than to secure agreement for example on who is our favorite player. 
The tone of the discussions is theoretical and argumentative. Gains for all members are real. 
Second, we have to state rules for day-to-day policies within the framework. Making 
decisions by majority ensures the workability of the political process. The tone of the discussions 
is one of weighting up interests and bargaining (Elster, 1991). Ordinary politics, post constitutional 
choice, tends to be conflictual. The reformed EU treaty, however, gives unanimous consent a 
smaller role, without making the distinction between the just-mentioned two sorts of decisions.  
Part of the difficulty of our answer is constitutional illiteracy. As Hayek said: “The most 
important outcome of the socialist epoch, however, has been the destruction of the traditional 
limitations upon the powers of the state” ([1960], 2006, p. 223). We have to shore up 
constitutional understanding: the choice by individuals, who are related one to another in an 
anticipated set of interactions, of a reciprocally binding constraint. Rules and institutions rather 
than outcomes should be the focus. In general, orthodox public finance, with its emphasis on the 
direct application of  normative criteria to tax arrangements, does not give us an understanding of 
observed fiscal processes in the EU nor is it a basis for improvement on grounds that are 
acceptable to the taxpayers. As we do test in this paper, the logic of a constitutional approach can 
give such an interpretation, just as it gave an analytic interpretation of the popular tax revolts 
sweeping across the U.S. in the late 1970s (Buchanan, [1980], 2000, p. 220-221).  
There are no unique constitutional solutions; several combinations of electoral and non-
electoral rules are possible. In this paper, we first look at the tasks the EU has to do, and second we 
look at the way fiscal policy is decided. If political and cultural differences do exist and freedom 
of choice and free initiative of citizens is important, limiting constitutional rules do make sense. 
Which reform of the EU budget is necessary? We can look back and learn from history. We look 
at what did shape the American fiscal constitution (Dam, 1977). If the problem is to carry over 
tasks to supranational authorities, as is the case in new Treaty of Lisbon, we do feel protected if 
these supranational authorities can act on two provisions. Firstly, and, for James Buchanan, most 
importantly, on provisions that lay out the (limited) range and scope of activities that are 
appropriately to be undertaken (2001, p. 442). Secondly, on provisions that state a bicameral fiscal 
(constitutional) framework (cp. Friedman, [1962], 2002, pp. 2-3). 
 
 
Limiting the tasks of the EU 
 
 
If the problem is how to establish a limited government, we can look at the constitution of 
the U.S. In the U.S., two authorities are of interest: the authorities in each of the states and the 
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federal government in Washington. Is that not too much government? Not if both authorities 
compete with each other in the sense that they each have their own branch of power. We can guard 
a branch if a constitution does support us. As has been said by James Madison, one of the founders 
of the American constitution, in the U.S. constitution the central authorities do have little and 
limited and the states do have many and large competences. The former has powers related to 
foreign policy and national defense. The latter has powers related to the criminal justice system 
and the protection of the family. In the EU Treaty of Lisbon, however, the opposite seems to be the 
case: there seems to be little that does not fall under the jurisdiction of Brussels. The Treaty 
describes tasks that the EU has to do under all circumstances (e.g., customs, competition and 
monetary policy, fishing, trade and the internal market policy), tasks that can be appropriated if 
necessary (e.g., environmental policy and consumer protection) and tasks the EU supports (e.g., 
tourism) (Treaty, 2004 and 2007).  
Power, however, wants more power, all to the good or to the bad. Hence, every 
possibility, how artificially, the EU will use to enlarge it. The manner of subsidizing activities, for 
instance., enormously enhances the influence of the EU. Suppose the EU gives a subsidy of 50% 
to a certain activity. That is almost blackmail; no local government, in their good mind, is opposed 
to it. For the local authorities the gains of the activity has to be only halve of the total costs (cp. 
Edwards, 2005). The pressure to accept the subsidy is enormous. Even, however, if the given task 
for the (federal) central authorities is small, as, e.g., described in the U.S constitution, for 
insterstate trade. Just as the EU-authorities do have a stake in border crossing interests. That, 
however, is a license for government involvement, at least in the US, in approximately everything. 
Look at what did happen in the US. The federal authorities may not meddle with agriculture in the 
separate states. Yet---with the rule and power of the authority over interstate trade in hand---it 
states how many acres in the separate states have to remain wasted. How can the federal 
authorities motivate this? A farmer did grow grain on his “wasted” land and fed the grain to his 
cattle. At first site, no interstate trade seems to take place. The Supreme Court, however, did argue 
that if the farmer had not grown grain on his wasted land, he would have bought it. He, also, 
influenced the price of grain on the market and so interstate trade (Snyder, 1998).  
In sum, even if there is a clear separation of powers and limitation of tasks, as in the US, 
central government often grabs the possibility to enlarge its powers. What then can we expect of 
the description of tasks in the (revised) EU treaty? There seems to be little that does not fall 
directly or indirectly under the jurisdiction of Brussels. The EU has tasks to do under all 
circumstances (e.g., customs, competition and monetary policy, fishing, and internal market 
policy), tasks that can be appropriated if necessary (e.g., environmental policy and consumer 
protection) and tasks it supports (e.g., tourism) (Treaty, 2004, 2007). The just-stated possibility of 
subsidizing activities enormously enlarges the influence of the EU. See how acute the gold rush 
response is with “matching” grants. In general, also EU-tasks, in principle, are many and hard to 
control by a democratic decision-making process. A process in which everyone thinks that other 
people do pay for a certain policy and changing majorities have to be bought, time and again. An 
ever-increasing government budget might be expected.   
 
 
Limiting benefits to members of identified groups or countries  
 
 
  Democratic politics should be more than groups or Member States each seeking to 
further particular interest. The ultimate justification of collective action should be the persuasive 
force of nondiscrminatory objectives (Hayek, 1960). For Buchanan and Hayek this means the 
extension of the legal tradition in Western civil order of nondiscimination to the workings of 
ordinary politics.  Nondiscrmination is already the rule on the taxing side but not on the spending 
side of the EU-budget. The principle disqualifies all programs that target persons and Member 
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States who qualify in accordance with identification by ethnicity, location, occupation, industry, or 
activity (Buchanan, 2000).  
 
 
Limiting the powers of fiscal decision-making 
 
 
For Hayek it is necessary to create a Legislative Assembly (upper house) that states the 
rules and a Governmental Assembly (ordinary legislature or parliament) that administrates within 
those rules (1982, Vol. 3). A new and differently elected and organized Legislative Assembly 
should draw up semi-permanent fiscal rules, and should not be subject to influences of particular 
groups. In the EU, however, there is an intentional combination, the decision-making 
(institutional) triangle, of the European Commission, the European Council and European 
Parliament. All of whom state what the budget is and make the policy within it (Treaty, 2004 and 
2007). Consequently, the proposed change in policy of the EU from unanimity to majority rule is 
no effective constraint on the exercise and growth of EU power (Brennan and Buchanan, 2000).  
Constitutional economics is both thinking outside the box and back to basics. For the EU 
it is scientifically largely uncharted territory. Hayek’s model of bicameralism for fiscal powers for 
example, to my knowledge, has never been part of any political agenda. It is thinking outside the 
box of mainstream public finance (Blankart, 1991). In due course, the separate “taxation chamber” 
can even grow into an institution where all legislation in the EU is made independently from the 
direct policy use of it. For Buchanan the European constitution is an opportunity, EU citizens need 
to grasp, for going back to constitutional basics (1991, 1996a). The constitutionalist mindset, 
however, that says that persons owe loyalty to the constitution rather than to the government, is 
(has become) foreign to European thinking (Buchanan, 1996b, 2003). The idea that there are, or 
should be, any limits on the powers of the government has largely passed from the contemporary 
scene. This lack of a constitutional mindset is also part of the problem this research program has to 
tackle.  
Of central importance is that constitutionalism can be the core of fiscal constraints in 
which subsidiarity (the primary liability for the solution of problems lies with the smallest 
functional unit) and the consent of free individuals (trust), two of the main problems of the EU, are 
of central importance. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In general, the EU-budget hovers between one that redistributes money between members 
and one that achieves certain EU-wide policies. The budget is the cause of many of the bitterest 
arguments between the Member States. Often, the objective of spending seems to be to achieve 
acceptable net balances rather than agreed policy. It has been said that the EU budget has never 
been used as a means to meet the objectives of the Union but rather as a negotiating tool for its 
members.  
If fiscal dissatisfaction in the EU is the result of a growing tendency in which majorities 
do decide, and hence does give changing majority coalitions political authority, within that 
framework we can never solve the problem. There is another possibility. Form the point of view of 
constitutional economics and fiscal sociology two things are necessary. One, we need a fiscal 
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constitution on the bases of a clearly enumerated list of tasks for the EU. Second, we have to split 
fiscal powers: the establishment of a separate legislative branch of the EU that does state the 
principles of taxation and another branch that makes policy inside those rules. Presently, however, 
often majority by means of the European Commission and the European Parliament does set the 
fiscal rules as well as does make policy inside those rules on a seemingly endless list of possible 
tasks. 
In sum, this paper shows how we can use the reformed new EU-budget by imposing 
constraining rules to promote solidarity and trust, a shared framework facilitates a robust 
democratic debate, in the setting of an EU-Leviathan. Instead of emphasizing efficiency, to up-
date goals and means, and/or to aim at greater fairness the paper shifts the emphasis to the making 
of authentic rules: the design of possible constraints on a revenue-maximizing EU. Because of 
their voluntary consent (an internal criterion based on the desires of the Member States 
themselves) it is acceptable to the Member States that are to be subject to it. No external criteria, 
and hence no agreement over the goodness or badness of these criteria used, e.g., allocative 
efficiency or equal treatment for equals, are necessary. The shared framework of a model EU-
budget (politically independent fiscal rules) creates trust and social cohesion between the Member 
States, the European Parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers. It facilitates a robust 
democratic debate within a consistent, transparent and reliable policy and legislation framework. 
Member States can anticipate making appropriate behavior adjustments, including those made 
over a long–term planning period. The paper gives the analytical arguments in support of two 
appropriately designed budgetary measures (moderately permanent features) re the up-coming EU 
Budget Review: a clear limitation of tasks, nondiscriminatory budget politics, and a split in 
budgetary powers. Though the model of a budget-maximizing Leviathan-like EU bureaucracy, a 
discretionary agency, may seem extreme, the norms laid down may possible prove acceptable as 
embodying the strategy to ensure that the best remains a possibility by guarding against the worst.   
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